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among women in contemporary Chinese society. No longer raised on the
pronouncements of the symbolic father figure as they were during the Mao
era, they must seek fulfilment through their sons and against their own in-
stincts. 
The book’s conclusion examines the specificity of relationships between
the Party-state and the market, and between the latter and the ethical
question expressed in the “grassroots” demands of citizens. This analysis sit-
uates the Chinese experience within a broader framework and poses ques-
tions about the structural integrity of the two conflicting sides that
comprise our new historicity: a globalised financial economy on one side,
and the demands and rights of the human subject on the other, signalling
the tensions, practices, and nature of the conflicts, where, paradoxically, the
subject of rights is both market commodity and ethical subject.
The groups, social categories, and collective movements presented in this
publication make frequent reference to an ethic of conviction and respon-
sibility. These citizens and volunteers are the salt of the earth, building the
civil society of the future. Monique Selim’s anthropological approach has
the unique benefit of showing us, at close quarters, their ability to observe
and analyse, allowing them to express what they feel the threats are, and
the multitude of ways to ensure that their rights are recognised.
z Translated by David Buchanan.
z Nicole Khouri is a sociologist and associate researcher at IMAF
(Institute of African Worlds), UMR 8171, Paris, and at CEsA (Centre
for Studies on Africa, Asia and Latin America), University of Lisbon,
Portugal (khouri.n@wanadoo.fr). 
It is clear from the outset that the Chinese economy’s energy efficiency
has been increasing over the past three decades. This can be seen from the
fact that between 1980 and 2010, the Chinese economy’s CO2 intensity fell
from nine kg to three kg of CO2 per dollar of GDP created, while that of in-
dustry slid from 18 kg to a little more than three kg. 
Such an evolution was possible because of deliberate public policies. Right
from the early 1980s, the authorities put in place energy efficiency criteria
in a certain number of industrial sectors and included adherence to these
criteria in the checklist for evaluating cadres. China inaugurated an industrial
restructuring policy that took the form of a vast programme of mergers and
acquisitions with the slogan “grasp the large, let go the small.” Despite some
difficulties in implementation, this modernisation strategy deeply trans-
formed the four industrial sectors studied in this book. 
Between 1985 and 2010, CO2 intensity in cement production fell by
36% (p. 69), that of iron and steel by 64% (p. 105), of aluminium by 49%
(p. 145), and of paper by 57% (p. 182). The differences between the levels
of emissions obtained and what would have corresponded to the reference
scenario were considerable. Thus in 2010, cement factories prevented the
emission of 904 million tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere (p. 70), iron
and steel factories about 2.5 billion tonnes (p. 106), aluminium firms
nearly 175 million tonnes (p. 135), and paper mills about 185 million
tonnes (p. 179).   
What the authors say regarding cement production holds almost word
for word for the chapters on the three other sectors and summarises the
book’s conclusions. Rock and Toman note that “none of this would have
been possible without a strong central government committed to a prag-
matic approach to industrial development and high-speed technological
learning in energy intensive industries” (p. 73).
The results obtained through detailed study of the four branches are con-
firmed by statistical studies presented by the authors. They show that higher
energy prices combined with investment in new technologies and formation
of larger companies led to diminution of energy intensity (p. 208).
Of course, this does not mean CO2 emissions have fallen in absolute value,
but simply that there is now a decoupling between growth in GDP and that
in greenhouse gas emissions. Between 1971 and 2011, China’s GDP rose
33-fold, from US$127 billion to US$4,195 billion, with an average annual
growth rate of a little over 9.2%, while during the same period, energy con-
sumption rose from 392 million tonnes oil equivalent to 2.727 billion
tonnes, a 6.9-fold increase, with a growth rate of almost 5%. Given these
conditions, it is possible to better understand why in climate negotiations,
China systematically stresses the need to take into account intensity indi-
cators. The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), for instance, aimed to reduce
CO2 emissions by 11% per unit of GDP. (1)
China is by far the planet’s top CO2 emitter and will remain so for a very
long time. With 10.3 billion tonnes of emissions, it accounts for nearly a
third of global emissions (35.3 billion tonnes). Besides, China’s per capita
emissions are nearly eight tonnes, equivalent to the level of the EU’s 28
countries (France being a bit lower at five tonnes).
Of course, some of these figures need to be regarded with caution: in early
November 2015, it was learned that Beijing had massively underestimated
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In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China acquired the world’ssecond largest economy and became the top carbon dioxide emitter aswell as the leading consumer of energy. The future of the planet’s climate
is thus bound up with the Chinese economy’s evolution.
Therein lies the interest in the work of Michael T. Rock and Michael A. Toman,
who take stock of evolution in four industries – aluminium, cement, iron and
steel, and paper – that have contributed substantially (at least the first three)
to the country’s transformation and are among the highest CO2 emitters in
China. While industry as a whole accounts for 60% of China’s CO2 emissions,
the four sectors cited represent nearly 60% of industrial emissions. China’s
Technological Catch-Up Strategy seeks to understand – by examining these
four high-energy consuming industries – the impact of technological upgrad-
ing on the Chinese economy’s energy efficiency and CO2 intensity.
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Strategy: Industrial Develop-
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1. For more details on these figures, see Jean-Paul Maréchal, “La Chine et le climat. Mur de l’envi-
ronnement et bras de fer sino-américain” (China and Climate: The Environment Wall and Sino-
US Tussle), in Pierre Alary and Elsa Lafaye de Micheaux (eds), Capitalismes asiatiques et puissance
chinoise (Asian Capitalisms and Chinese Might), Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015, pp. 95 and
107.
coal consumption in the 2000-2012 period. The result: in 2012, Chinese CO2
emissions had to be reassessed at one billion tonnes, (2) or nearly thrice the
total French emissions! Nothing too surprising in this discovery, given that
an article published in 2012 showed that based on data supplied by local
statistics departments, China in 2010 emitted 1.4 billion tonnes of CO2
more than it was declaring. (3)
The book by Rock and Toman containing meticulous analyses, several
graphs, tables, and concrete examples constitutes an interesting contribu-
tion to a debate that is far from over.
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
z Jean-Paul Maréchal is associate professor of economics at the
Université Paris-Sud (marechal.jean-paul@wanadoo.fr).
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Book reviews
gift that generates obligation and indebtedness, while bringing with it a high
expectation of being reciprocated with gratitude and loyalty. 
Based upon historical sources, policymaking analysis, and ethnographic field-
work, Yeh effectively shows how development has been deployed by the Chinese
state as both a theoretical principle and an applied strategy aimed at the terri-
torial incorporation of the Tibetan land and its inhabitants. In this sense, the
purpose of any Chinese development project carried on since the 1950s ulti-
mately entails a hegemonic discourse that – beyond its merely economic pur-
pose – assumes and in fact demands that Tibetans should appreciate the gift. 
The book exposes the consequences of different development projects
and outlines the social and economic dynamics involving Tibetans, the state,
the land, and Han newcomers over the course of 60 years. The author iden-
tifies three phases of government intervention in Tibet, and more specifically
in Lhasa, each characterised by a single development focus, respectively:
state farms, greenhouses, and house building. This long narrative is arranged
around these three thematic and chronological nuclei, poignantly named
soil, plastic, and concrete, which over time have reconfigured Lhasa from
originally being the very centre of Tibet to its present status as a geographic,
cultural, and economic periphery in need of development.
The first part, “Soil,” deals with the earliest phase of development (1950s-
1980s) and the first transformations of the Tibetan landscape through the
institution of state farms, with the introduction of new modes of production
and the initial cultivation of the land that involved the joint efforts of the
Chinese army and the local people. In terms of centre-periphery relations,
the first years witnessed the best period in the history of the region: the
enthusiasm animating both the Han soldiers and the local Tibetans working
in the state farms sustained relatively good ethnic relations that rapidly de-
teriorated afterwards, following the increasing symbolic and effective con-
quering of the land. 
This part of the book sheds light on many pieces of diversified memories
from that time that have been often silenced in the Tibetan exile commu-
nities, including, for example, the improvement of gender equality thanks
to the inclusion of women in farming work. Extracts from interviews and
memories vivify and contextualise the historical reconstruction of this and
the next two parts of the book: the constant shifting between concrete
micro-examples of biographical experiences and broader political issues of-
fers a complex and complete narrative to the reader, and this alternating
macro-micro lens authenticates the accuracy of the historical and political
analysis.
In the second part, “Plastic,” the chronological focus is on the 1990s, a
critical phase of transition from state economy to market economy at the
national level that had a direct impact on development strategies in Tibet.
State farms were progressively abandoned, and a growing number of Han
migrant workers from Sichuan Province took over the emerging market of
greenhouses that spread through the suburban villages around Lhasa. 
The author provides an insightful analysis of the interdependence of mul-
tiple political, economic, and cultural levels of discourses and practices that,
following the introduction of greenhouses, marked Tibetans’ overdetermined
condition of marginalisation in vegetable farming and markets (p. 121). For
Tibetans, the decollectivisation of agriculture essentially entailed not only
nonparticipation but also a progressive exclusion from the new lines of mar-
ket-led development.
With Han immigrants replacing the previous direct intervention of the
state, the issue of Tibetan development became further connected to ethnic
tensions, and the naturalisation of the increasing presence of Han workers
VALENTINA PUNZI
Studies about the economic development of China’s western regionshave mainly focused on the central government-driven plans carriedout since the post-1980 reform period and intensified during the last
decade. However, without a much-needed historical assessment of earlier
development projects started in the 1950s, the China Western Development
(Xibu da kaifa) program launched in 2000 and the most recent One Belt
One Road (Yi dai yi lu) initiative promoted last year have often been mis-
takenly presented as sudden sprouts without seeds.
In her insightful work, Taming Tibet: Landscape Transformation and the
Gift of Chinese Development, Emily Yeh contributes to filling this gap with
an excellent monographic study that explores the topic of development in
the circumscribed location of Lhasa City and its environs over the long
stretch from the 1950s to the 2000s. Through a detailed account of Chinese
policy changes during this period, she analyses the interconnections among
physical, economic, and social transformations that affected the historical
and religious capital of Tibet.
The main argument of the book is that from the beginning, the Chinese
state enterprise’s coercive development strategies were conceived as acts
of benevolence and that development itself was “offered” to Tibetans as an
irrefutable gift to establish effective national rule in Tibet. Drawing on the
Maussian theory of the gift, the author maintains that through the disguised
act of disinterested giving, Chinese development is given to Tibetans as a
2. Chris Buckley, “China Burns Much More Coal Than Reported, Complicating Climate Talks,” The
New York Times, 3 November 2015.
3. Dabo Guan, Zhu Liu, Yong Geng, Sören Lindner, and Klaus Hubacek, “The Gigatonne Gap in China’s
Carbon Dioxide Inventories,” Nature Climate Change, No. 2, 2012, pp. 672-675.
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